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TRANSFORMATION: THE BRIGHT LINE BETWEEN 
COMMERCIAL PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
W. Mack Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Right of Publicity provides to each and every person the right 
to use his or her persona for his or her benefit and provides a cause of 
action to stop the unauthorized use of that persona for commercial 
purposes. 
This right is one of the many provided by the laws of unfair 
competition.  Infringement of this right has become a frequently pleaded 
count made by attorneys who are trying to protect their clients from the 
unauthorized use of the client’s persona for commercial purposes.  
While the genesis of the right has been commonly thought to be a 
splintering from the Right to Privacy, which in turn owes its birth to an 
article in a Harvard Law Journal in 1890,1 it may be more accurate to 
say that it has long been a common law right and has a common origin 
in trademark law as a commercial fraud. 
Originally, the Right of Publicity was thought to protect only the 
unauthorized use of a person’s name, likeness and image.2  Now, 
however, it is generally understood to encompass any personal attribute 
that identifies a particular person.  For ease of discussion, that identity is 
referred to as the individual’s persona.  The identifying attribute may be 
 
  ∗  © 2002  W. Mack Webner.  Mr. Webner is a partner in the intellectual property law firm 
of Sughrue Mion, PLLC in Washington, D.C.  He litigates all types of intellectual property cases 
and has litigated several right of publicity cases.  Leigh Ann Lindquist is an associate in the 
intellectual property law firm of Sughrue Mion, PLLC.  This paper was originally presented at the 
2002 Sughrue Symposium at the University of Akron. 
 1. 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
28:3 (4th ed. 2003). 
 2. See Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
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the individual’s name, likeness, image, voice,3 unique property identified 
with a person,4 or recognizable attire and “look,” unique to a person and 
by which he or she is known.5 
The use of the Right of Publicity as a separate count in a complaint 
has become sufficiently common that it can now be said that it has come 
of age.  Of course, there are still those who refuse to accept that the right 
grew in an appropriate fashion, and consider it to be like Topsy, arriving 
without any identifiable parentage.  Whatever its origin, the reality is 
that it is here and that, in the last ten years, it has been separately pled 
and discussed in at least seventy-five different reported federal court 
cases.6 
It is clearly the majority view that the unauthorized use of a 
persona gives rise to a cause of action that may be pleaded in addition to 
the usual unfair competition causes of action of trademark infringement, 
unfair competition, copyright infringement, and false advertising.  The 
Right of Publicity has a family resemblance to all of those causes of 
action, but it is, in fact, independent of them, and provides a separate 
means of recovery in addition to those more commonly utilized counts. 
The modern use of the Right of Publicity cause of action can be 
traced to the Supreme Court decision in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co.,7 a case that arose out of the state of Ohio.  Ohio and 
the Sixth Circuit have provided some of the more interesting cases 
dealing with the Right of Publicity; yet one does not automatically think 
of the middle of America as being a hot bed of celebrities where 
publicity rights would be frequently litigated.  While Detroit, in the 
northernmost state in the circuit, has Motown music, and Nashville, in 
the southernmost state, provides country music and both have numerous 
celebrities, the cases considered by the Sixth Circuit have not involved 
the music celebrities of either of those cities.  Rather, Elvis from 
Memphis,8 portable toilets from Michigan,9 toys from Kentucky,10 sports 
 
 3. See, e.g., Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (unique singing voice 
and style); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 4. Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (racing car). 
 5. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), reh’g denied, 989 F.2d 
1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (involving the well-recognized dress and appearance of Vanna White, the 
letter-turner on the television game show Wheel of Fortune).  Also consider the bowler hat, floppy 
shoes and cane of Charlie Chaplin’s character “The Tramp.” 
 6. This number is based on a review of cases through Westlaw using the description “Right 
of Publicity.” 
 7. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 8. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 9. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 10. Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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management in Cleveland,11 Rosa Parks in Michigan,12 and of course the 
Zacchini cannonball act provide interesting points of development of the 
right. 
II.  RIGHT OF PUBLICITY: RECOGNIZED BUT NOT UNIFORM 
Unfortunately, the Right of Publicity has not attained uniform 
national recognition.  Application of the law depends on each state’s 
interpretation of the right: some agree that it is a common law right that 
has always existed; others cling to the view that it is a branch of the 
privacy right and is only a creature of statute; and still others have yet to 
opine on it at all.13  Moreover, the right seems to cause visceral reactions 
from judges who decide the issue.  A few years ago, the International 
Trademark Association (INTA) unsuccessfully attempted to create a 
model definition for the Right of Publicity.  The plan never fully 
developed because of differing views among INTA members.  Today, 
we remain without any uniform law or federal legislation. 
Early efforts to get states in which the rich and famous reside, and 
whose personas are most attractive to marketers, to recognize the right 
were two pronged.  Cases were filed in state courts urging the 
recognition of a common law right, and legislative efforts were 
undertaken to have the right codified.  The result was mixed.  Some 
states recognize the right as an advertising right; some have a term limit 
for the right while others do not; some recognize that the right is 
descendible; others hold that it is a personal right that terminates upon 
the person’s death.14  The result of these differences is that the very 
corporations that prefer that there not be a uniform act or federal law are 
left to deal with the vagaries of each state. 
III.  TODAY’S HOT ISSUES FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
Although there are perhaps a number of issues which could be 
considered “hot” in the field of the Right of Publicity, the discussion 
here is limited to two issues which seem to raise the most angst.  First is 
the descendability of the right: once the celebrity dies, are the 
 
 11. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc.,  99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000), aff’d, 332 F.3d 
915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 12. Parks v. LaFace Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Mich. 1999), rev’d, 329 F.3d 437 (6th 
Cir. 2003). 
 13. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 28:45, at 28-71. 
 14. Id. at 28-71; see, e.g., the statutes of Virginia, Nevada, Tennessee, California, and New 
York. 
3
Webner and Lindquist: The Bright Line
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
WEBNER2.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
174 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:171 
heirs/estate able to exclusively exploit that right?  Second is the 
protection the First Amendment affords as a defense to an allegation of 
the Right of Publicity.  Both issues continue to generate discussion: 
when, if ever, does the right cease and where does protection of the 
Right of Publicity end and the First Amendment begin? 
A. Should the Right Descend? 
While the Right of Publicity is a right that we all have, it is clear 
that most of us will not have reason to exercise the right.  The states that 
we think of as having the most “celebrities” have a fairly well 
established jurisprudence outlining the applicability of the right to living 
individuals.15  There are not a significant number of open questions in 
those states, notwithstanding that their laws are not uniform. 
1. State Decisions and Codifications 
However, there is an issue as to when the right terminates.  Those 
states that have codified the right have all legislated a term-limit to the 
right.  In New York, the right dies with the individual.16  In Indiana and 
Nevada, the publicity right lasts for 100 years after death.  In California, 
the right lasts for fifty years after death and, in Tennessee, the right 
terminates only upon its abandonment.  The differences have occurred as 
a result of lobbying by various interest groups.  Those lobbying efforts 
in New York and Tennessee are particularly interesting.  It is also 
important to remember that the law of the state where the deceased is 
domiciled at the time of his/her death is the law that applies. 
a. The Law in New York 
In New York, the law is considered a part of the law of privacy of 
the state.  The statute was enacted after the landmark case of Roberson v. 
Rochester Folding Box Co.17 There, a miller used a young woman’s 
image to sell his flour.18  The young woman sued and alleged an 
invasion of her privacy right.19  The claim was founded on the privacy 
theory expounded in the 1890 Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis 
 
 15. California, New York, Neveda and Tennessee.  The selection is not scientific, merely 
antecdotal as a result of their entertainment centers in Hollywood, New York City,  Las Vegas, 
Nashville and Memphis. 
 16. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 28:45, at 28-72. 
 17. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss2/1
WEBNER2.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
2004] THE BRIGHT LINE 175 
Harvard Law Journal article, Right To Privacy,20 in which they argued 
that a right of privacy existed at common law and that every one had the 
right to be let alone.  The New York court held that there was no 
common law right of privacy in New York and denied any recovery to 
the woman.21 
The Roberson decision caused a public outcry and, the year 
following the decision, the New York legislature passed a law to correct 
the injustice done to the young woman.  The newly enacted legislation 
provided a cause of action for using a name or photograph of a living 
person for advertising purposes without authorization of the person.22 
In the early 1980’s, following decisions of the United States 
District Courts in New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
there were hearings to amend the New York statute.  Lobbying on behalf 
of advertising, publicity, press and entertainment interests successfully 
prevented any changes to extend protection to the deceased and to 
broaden the law to cover attributes other than names and photographs.  
Thus, to date, the law of New York remains as it was when the statute 
was enacted in 1903. 
b. The Law in Tennessee 
In Tennessee, the Right of Publicity legislation was enacted as a 
result of a series of cases primarily involving Elvis Presley.23  In the first 
of these cases, Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit 
determined that, under New York law, the Right of Publicity could 
survive a celebrity’s death if the right had been exploited during the 
celebrity’s life.24  The court upheld the lower court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction.25 
The Second Circuit had an opportunity to reconsider the 
descendability of the Right of Publicity two years later in a second 
 
 20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 21. Roberson, 64 N.E. at 442. 
 22. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (2003). 
 23. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) [hereinafter Factors I]; 
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Factors II]; Memphis 
Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 956 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 24. Factors I, 579 F.2d at 222, overruled by Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns, Inc., 64 
N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984).  In Stephano, the highest court for the state of New York held that there 
was no common law Right of Publicity; the Right of Publicity was found in the 1903 statute.  Id. at 
183. 
 25. Factors I, 579 F.2d at 222. 
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appeal of the same case.26  This time, the court reviewed the lower 
court’s issuance of a permanent injunction. 
In its second review of the case, the Second Circuit addressed the 
choice of law issue: which state’s law applied in determining whether or 
not the Right of Publicity descended, New York or Tennessee?27  When 
the case first came to the court, neither party raised the conflict of law 
issue, and the court summarily decided that the law of New York applied 
as that was where the “wrong” had occurred.28  At this second bite of the 
apple, the parties raised the choice of law issue as the Sixth Circuit, in a 
different Elvis Presley case, Memphis Development Foundation v. 
Factors, Etc.,29 had recently considered whether or not Tennessee 
common law provided for a descendible Right of Publicity. 
After considering the choice of law issue, the Second Circuit held 
that Tennessee law applied as opposed to New York law.30  Moreover, 
because Tennessee had no statute dealing with the Right of Publicity and 
because its courts had not ruled on the issue, the federal court of appeals 
in New York declared that it should rule as if it were a court sitting in 
Tennessee.31  Although there were no decisions out of Tennessee’s state 
courts, the United States District Court in Memphis had recently decided 
the issue favorably for the Elvis Presley interests.32  That district court 
held that the Tennessee courts would find a descendible common law 
Right of Publicity and so enforced the Elvis Presley publicity rights 
against the seller of Elvis statues.33  This would have ended the matter, 
except the Sixth Circuit reversed that district court’s decision and said 
that Tennessee would not find a common law Right of Publicity.34 
The Sixth Circuit expressed a panoply of concerns.  It said that if 
the Right of Publicity survived the individual’s death, i.e., was an 
inheritable right, “[a] whole set of practical problems of judicial line-
drawing” would occur.35  “How long would the ‘property’ interest last?  
In perpetuity?  For a term of years?  Is the right of publicity taxable? At 
what point does the right collide with the right of free expression 
 
 26. Factors II, 652 F.2d at 278. 
 27. Id. at 280. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d 956. 
 30. Factors II, 652 F.2d at 281. 
 31. Id. at 283. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 280.  The statues were miniatures of a statue that was being sculpted to stand on 
Beale Street in Memphis in honor of Presley.  Id.  Selling the statues was a means of raising the 
funds to pay for the full sized statue.  Id. 
 34. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 956. 
 35. Id. at 959. 
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guaranteed by the [F]irst [A]mendment?”36 
In any event, the Second Circuit, over a vigorous dissent by Judge 
Mansfield, decided that it should follow the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Memphis Development since the Sixth Circuit had considered the issue 
of whether or not Tennessee had a descendible Right of Publicity and 
there was no Tennessee court ruling on the issue.37  The Second Circuit 
held there was no Right of Publicity in Tennessee.38  Not only did this 
seem wrong because Tennessee, especially Nashville, is the residence of 
a considerable number of famous entertainers, but also because 
Tennessee recognized the protection of names as trade names at 
common law.39  In fact, the Second Circuit, when discussing the holding 
in Memphis Development, noted that “[t]he writer would probably 
uphold a descendible right of publicity, were he serving on the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, and perhaps if he served on the Sixth Circuit 
when Memphis Development was decided.”40  Nonetheless, the federal 
appeals court sitting in New York followed its sister court in the Sixth 
Circuit.41 
These decisions caused serious problems for the Estate of Elvis 
Presley.  A significant licensing program for Elvis products was in 
jeopardy.  It had two options: go to court or go to the legislature.  It did 
both. 
2. The Tennessee Statute 
The Estate of Elvis Presley successfully sponsored a Tennessee 
statute which strongly resembles the Lanham Act.  There is a reason for 
this.  First, the Presley rights were being secured as trademarks, because 
that area of the law was established.  It could not rely solely on a 
publicity right which was relatively untested in most jurisdictions and 
was being applied against its interests.  The analogy between the Right 
of Publicity and trademarks was apparent, and the similarities made the 
use of similar language for personal publicity rights seem appropriate. 
Second, because the Sixth Circuit expressed concern about how 
long the right would last, the Tennessee act adopted trademark 
reasoning.  It declares that the right continues for so long as it is not 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Factors II, 652 F.2d at 283. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See e.g., C.F. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfield Drug Co., 23 S.W. 165 (Tenn. 1893) 
(granting injunction for use of name and portrait under trademark and unfair competition theories). 
 40. Factors II, 652 F.2d at 282. 
 41. Id. at 282-83. 
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abandoned by its owners.  Like a trademark, it can continue in 
perpetuity.  The Tennessee act also recognizes that the right is 
descendible and devisable. 
The perpetual grant of the publicity right granted by the Tennessee 
statute seems appropriate.  Why should a valuable property right that is 
promoted, used and maintained become public domain?  Why should 
persons who did nothing to develop or maintain the right have access to 
it for their personal gain?  Why should those who created the persona, 
protected it, invested in it and made it valuable be deprived of it merely 
as a result of the passage of time? 
3. Tennessee Common Law 
The Estate of Elvis Presley also filed suit in Tennessee state court.  
Before the enactment of the Tennessee Right of Publicity statute, the 
Appeals Court of Tennessee reached a decision in this Presley case and 
ruled that Tennessee would recognize a common law Right of 
Publicity.42  This ruling was followed less than four weeks later by a 
Sixth Circuit decision in yet another Elvis Presley case.  There, the Sixth 
Circuit acknowledged that its view of the termination of the Right of 
Publicity, as decided in Memphis Development, had been expressly 
rejected by a Tennessee state court.43  The Estate of Elvis Presley 
succeeded on both the legal and legislative fronts in garnering rights in 
the Presley image. 
4. The Right Should Descend 
The argument against descendability of the publicity right seems to 
center around a particular economic argument.  Would people be more 
likely to become celebrities if they knew that they could create and 
devise a property right that protected that celebrity?  If the right were 
limited only to celebrities, the argument might have more weight.  If we 
accept that the right belongs to all and that its infringement is the 
commercial use of it without authority, then whether the commercial use 
is mere “good luck” or the result of a well defined business plan seems 
immaterial.  An important consideration is that once the commercial 
value of a persona is determined, for whatever reason, the individual 
and/or his or her heirs maintain that value.  If the value has been 
 
 42. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1987). 
 43. Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Elvisly Yours, Inc., 817 F.2d 104, 104 (6th Cir. 1987). 
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maintained and if its maintenance continues by the heirs or assignees, 
why should it escheat at some predetermined time, to the public? 
Judge Merritt of the Sixth Circuit in Memphis Development 
appeared to believe that fame is a result of public adoration that has little 
or nothing to do with the individual.44  Elvis Presley would not have 
been famous if the public did not like his voice, but his voice and his 
charisma did cause great adoration of the public.  Moreover, that 
charisma and interest in his persona has been maintained by his 
assignees, and his name, likeness and image continue to draw interest 
and revenues twenty-five years after his death. 
On a different level is Dave Thomas of Wendy’s Restaurant fame.  
What justification is there for another to trade on Dave Thomas’s 
persona?  Unlike Elvis, Mr. Thomas was a successful businessman who 
used his forthrightness as a marketing tool.  His name, likeness and 
image became well known in association with, inter alia, restaurants.  
Should Wendy’s competitors or others pushing their wares now be 
permitted to trade on Mr. Thomas’s persona, merely because he is 
deceased?  If so, why? 
Both the name and likeness of Elvis and Dave Thomas are 
trademarks.  Perhaps both are sufficiently famous as trademarks that 
they would find additional protection under the dilution acts of the states 
or the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.45  Nonetheless, if others use 
these personas to promote products without authorization, they are and 
should be subject to the sanctions under a Right of Publicity 
infringement theory.  These others have done nothing to make these 
personas well-known and commercially important icons.  They have 
done nothing to protect these images while the persons were alive or 
since.  The culture and philosophy of American business is not to reward 
those who “reap where [they] ha[ve] not sown.”46  This philosophy is the 
underpinning of the law of unfair competition.  The Right of Publicity is 
a part of the law of unfair competition and that law’s philosophy should 
be applied to it. 
B. What Trumps What and When: the Right of Publicity v. the First 
Amendment 
As the Right of Publicity has become a more familiar cause of 
action, pleading of First Amendment defenses has increased and led to 
 
 44. Memphis Dev., 616 F.2d at 958. 
 45. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1996). 
 46. Int’l News Serv., Inc. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 221 (1918). 
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an unfortunate friction between these rights.47  Property ownership and 
property rights are highly valued in our capitalistic society, and a 
considerable number of our laws are devoted to the protection of 
property.  However, we also place a high value on our freedoms, 
particularly the freedom of speech and freedom of the press, both of 
which are fundamental to a democratic society. 
Thus, there has been a continual issue in the development of the 
Right of Publicity law relative to the extent to which the First 
Amendment constrains the exercise of the Right of Publicity.  Courts 
continue to differ in the scope of protection they afford each right.  The 
decisions may reflect a social bias of the particular court either for 
property rights and recognition of limits to the First Amendment, or for 
limited property rights and an unfettered First Amendment right.  It is 
clear that the unfettered First Amendment right advocates are more 
focused, more vocal and more zealously organized than are the publicity 
rights advocates.  To prevent the whittling away of intellectual property 
rights, intellectual property lawyers need, from time-to-time, to push for 
a wider orbit of protection for the rights they represent, lest those rights 
be diminished. 
Interestingly, those who have a vested interest in and frequently 
undertake the enforcement of their own intellectual property rights, 
primarily the publishing, press and advertising industries, also have an 
opposing interest in limiting the scope of the Right of Publicity.  When 
they use the publicity rights of others to sell their products, they seek an 
expansive reading of the First Amendment and frequently obtain it.  
From time-to-time, there is an indication from a court that someone has 
pushed too far and First Amendment protection is unavailable.48  
However, sometimes the most offensive acts are deemed protected under 
the First Amendment, as Hustler Magazine v. Falwell reveals.49 
In Hustler Magazine, the hardcore pornographic magazine, Hustler, 
depicted Jerry Falwell, the leader of a religious organization, in a 
sexually explicit act with his mother.50  Falwell sought damages based 
on claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional 
 
 47. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Governmentfor a redress of grievances.”  U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (emphaisis added). 
 48. See, e.g., Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Inc., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 49. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 50. Id. at 48. 
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distress.51  The Supreme Court held that a public figure is unable to 
recover damages for infliction of emotional distress.52 
In other cases, the Supreme Court has held secure the freedom of 
expression over personal rights by encompassing newsworthy purposes53 
and certain art forms, such as plays54 and film.55 There remains, 
however, the question of when the use of the publicity right is a 
protected expression and when is it merely an unauthorized commercial 
use for the sole purpose of profit.  It appears that, if a claim of parody 
can be established, almost anything can be said without regard to the 
insult that it may cause.56  But determining when the unauthorized use of 
a persona is protected speech and when it is infringement of the Right of 
Publicity, remains a hotly contested issue.  Our discussion here is 
restricted to a few key cases of unauthorized use of a persona for 
commercial purposes where the defendant has asserted a First 
Amendment privilege.  These cases represent issues yet to be directly 
presented to the Supreme Court and inconsistently decided by lower 
courts. 
The friction that we address does not arise from the desire to be let 
alone as Brandies and Warren argued in Right to Privacy, 57 but rather 
from that belief in the law of unfair competition that holds that one may 
not reap where one has not sown.58  When an advertiser uses the rights 
of others to promote and sell a product, it should expect to and be 
required to obtain authorization from the holder of the right to make that 
use or be penalized for the unauthorized use. 
Two types of unauthorized use of publicity rights that have been 
defended by asserting a First Amendment privilege provide the material 
for this discussion.  These areas are (1) the use of a persona in consumer 
art, and (2) the unauthorized use of a persona by newspapers and 
magazines to sell their newspapers and magazines. 
 
 51. Id. at 47-48. 
 52. Id. at 57. 
 53. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 54. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
 55. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 56. See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 46. 
 57. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 193. 
 58. See Int’l News Serv., Inc. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 221 (1918). 
11
Webner and Lindquist: The Bright Line
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
WEBNER2.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
182 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:171 
1. The Right of Publicity and Art 
We begin with two of the more recent Right of Publicity cases in 
which the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment face off.  Both 
involve the use of art for commercial purposes.  While the personas that 
are subjects of the art and the outcomes of the cases are dissimilar, the 
plaintiffs in both cases claimed infringement of the publicity right and 
the defendants in both cases relied on First Amendment defenses.  One 
decision limits the Publicity Right and the other amplifies a test for 
determining when the First Amendment should trump the Publicity 
Right. 
a. Tiger Woods and The Masters of Augusta 
This case is currently pending before the Sixth Circuit.  In ETW 
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,59 an artist painted the image of Tiger 
Woods, the professional golfer, with Woods’s caddy, his final round 
partner’s caddy, and other famous golfers - Arnold Palmer, Sam Snead, 
Ben Hogan, Walter Hagen, Bobby Jones, and Jack Nicklaus.60  The artist 
then licensed the painting to the defendant for the purpose of making 
“limited edition” prints for sale to the general public.61  The painting and 
the subsequent prints are entitled “The Masters of Augusta.”62  
According to the court, the painting was intended to celebrate the victory 
of Tiger Woods at the 1997 Masters Tournament in Augusta, Georgia.  
Woods’s exclusive licensing agent asserted, inter alia, that the prints 
infringed Woods’s Right of Publicity and, in cross motions for summary 
judgment, contended that the prints were commercial products, “merely 
sports merchandise.”63  Defendant raised a First Amendment defense 
that the prints were protected speech “because they are art works and do 
not constitute commercial speech.”64  Defendant described the paintings 
and prints as expressing the “majesty of a newsworthy moment.”65  The 
plaintiff did not directly address the publicity claim in its summary 
judgment motion but did address the First Amendment issue in its 
argument directed to its trademark infringement claims, citing cases that 
 
 59. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 60. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 830. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 834. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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hold that posters are not protected by the First Amendment.66 
The court held that the prints seek to express a message.67  
Therefore, the court reasoned, because the Supreme Court has said 
(albeit in dicta) that paintings are protected by the First Amendment,68 
the prints are protected speech.69  The message is not clearly identified 
other than in the self-serving platitudes the author set forth in the 
packaging for the prints to describe what he believes his art represents.70 
b. The Three Stooges and Silk Screening 
The ETW decision needs to be juxtaposed with the decision of the 
Supreme Court of California in the Three Stooges case.71  In this case, 
the defendant drew a picture of Larry, Curly and Moe, the famous 
slapstick vaudeville and movie stars, silk screened the picture onto T-
shirts, and produced lithographic prints of the drawing, all of which he 
sold.72  The plaintiff was the registered owner of all of the rights to the 
Three Stooges and sued, inter alia, for infringement of the Right of 
Publicity.73 
The decision of the California Supreme Court, relying heavily on 
its earlier decision, as well as the concurring opinion of then Chief 
Justice Bird, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions,74 is 
instructive. 
The California Court discussed (1) how the Right of Publicity is 
frequently a claim in commercial speech cases where a celebrity’s 
persona is used in a misleading manner as an endorsement of something 
the celebrity does not in fact endorse and (2) how the First Amendment 
does not protect false speech.75  The court then noted that false and 
misleading speech was not at issue.76  The court acknowledged that 
entertainment is entitled to First Amendment protection, as is visual art, 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 835. 
 68. See Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 
569 (1995); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973). 
 69. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 835-36. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 72. Id. at 800. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Gugliemi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979). 
 75. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 802; see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980). 
 76. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 802. 
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“even if it conveys no discernable message.”77  Even unconventional 
media for the art, as the Three Stooges art was, appearing as it did on T-
shirts, is not a factor for denying the protection of the First Amendment 
to the work, the court said.78  Then, however, the court said: 
But having recognized the high degree of First Amendment protection 
for noncommercial speech about celebrities, we need not conclude that 
all expression that trenches on the right of publicity receives such 
protection.  The right of publicity, like copyright, protects a form of 
intellectual property that society deems to have some social utility.79 
. . . . 
Although surprisingly few courts have considered in any depth the 
means of reconciling the right of publicity and the First Amendment, 
we follow those that have in concluding that depictions of celebrities 
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s 
economic value are not protected expression under the First 
Amendment.80 
The court then reviewed the decisions of the Courts in Zacchini 
(U.S. Supreme Court),81 Guglielmi (Supreme Court of California),82 
Estate of Presley (Federal District Court of New Jersey),83 and Groucho 
Marx Productions (Second Circuit),84 in which First Amendment 
defenses were considered, but found not to apply.85 
The court noted that, in Zacchini, the Supreme Court denied First 
Amendment protection to the television station that televised the entire 
act of Mr. Zacchini, the human cannonball, and upheld a Right of 
Publicity claim pleaded under Ohio common law.86  Quoting the Court 
in Zacchini, the Comedy III court said: “‘[T]he rationale for [protecting 
the right of publicity] is the straightforward one of preventing unjust 
enrichment by the theft of good will.  No social purpose is served by 
having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would 
have market value and for which he would normally pay.’”87  This 
 
 77. Id. at 804 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 805 (emphasis added). 
 81. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562. 
 82. Guglielmi, 603 P.2d 454. 
 83. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981). 
 84. Groucho Marx Prods., Inc. v. Day & Night Co., 523 F. Supp. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev’d 
on other grounds, 689 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 85. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 805-807. 
 86. Id. at 805. 
 87. Id. 
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language is very reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s early unfair 
competition case where it said that one may not reap where he has not 
sown.88  The California court in Comedy III went on to say: 
To be sure, Zacchini was not an ordinary right of publicity case: the 
defendant television station had appropriated the plaintiff’s entire 
act . . . . Nonetheless, two principles enunciated in Zacchini apply to 
this case: (1) state law may validly safeguard forms of intellectual 
property not covered under federal copyright and patent law as a 
means of protecting the fruits of a performing artist’s labor; and (2) the 
state’s interest in preventing the outright misappropriation of such 
intellectual property by others is not automatically trumped by the 
interest in free expression or dissemination of information; rather, as in 
the case of defamation, the state law interest and the interest in free 
expression must be balanced, according to the relative importance of 
the interests at stake.89 
The next case the Comedy III court considered was Guglielmi; its 
own decision in which it had adopted a similar balancing approach.90  
The Comedy III court wrote: 
Guglielmi concluded that the First Amendment protection of 
entertainment superseded any right of publicity . . . . Guglielmi 
proposed a balancing test to distinguish protected from unprotected 
appropriation of celebrity likenesses: “an action for infringement of the 
right of publicity can be maintained only if the proprietary interests at 
issue clearly outweigh the value of free expression in this context.”91 
The court then looked to the Presley case from the District of New 
Jersey.92  That court also applied a balancing test.  The Comedy III, court 
referring to the Presley decision, said: 
Acknowledging that the First Amendment protects entertainment 
speech, the court nonetheless rejected that constitutional defense. 
“[E]ntertainment that is merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully 
and accurately carried out, does not really have its own creative 
component and does not have a significant value as pure entertainment.  
As one authority has emphasized: ‘The public interest in entertainment 
will support the sporadic, occasional and good-faith imitation of a 
famous person to achieve humor, to effect criticism or to season a 
particular episode, but it does not give a privilege to appropriate 
 
 88. Int’l News Serv., Inc. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918). 
 89. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 806. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 806. 
 92. Id.; see also Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1339. 
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another’s valuable attributes on a continuing basis as one’s own 
without the consent of the other.’”93 
The California court noted that the New Jersey Presley court 
recognized that there was some intrinsic value in the defendant’s 
imitation of Presley but concluded that “the primary purpose of 
defendant’s activity is to appropriate the commercial value of the 
likeness of Elvis Presley.”94 
Finally, the California court cites the Groucho Marx Productions 
case but does not appear to agree that the Second Circuit court gave “due 
consideration” to the protection of various forms of expression.95  The 
Second Circuit, in Groucho Marx Productions, posed a dichotomy, the 
California court said, “between ‘works . . . designed primarily to 
promote the dissemination of thought, ideas or information through 
news or fictionalization,’ which would receive First Amendment 
protection, and ‘use of the celebrity’s name or likeness . . . largely for 
commercial purposes, such as the sale of merchandise,’ in which the 
right of publicity would prevail.”96 
The Comedy III court concluded that the question to be answered is 
whether or not the use of the celebrity’s image is transformative.97  That 
is, does the complained-of use do something more than merely copy the 
image of the celebrity or does the use of the image create something 
more than the mere copy?98  If a painting or statuary, memorabilia, etc., 
merely copies the image of the celebrity for the purpose of selling the 
merchandise to the public, then the publicity right should be given 
preferential weight to a First Amendment defense.99  The California 
court borrowed from copyright law and its “fair use” concepts.100  It 
noted that the fair use doctrine considers “the purpose and character of 
the use.”101  This, the court said, “does seem particularly pertinent to the 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Comedy III. Prods., 21 P.3d at 807. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 808 
 98. In the entertainment context, this is known as the “Rich Little” defense.  Rich Little is, or 
was, a mimic who performed in Las Vegas and on television imitating well-known people.  His 
abilities were concededly very good.  He did not, however, perform one person for his entire act.  
Rather, he mimicked many different people during his performance.  He brought something to the 
performance and could be said to have “transformed” the mere use of the celebrity’s voice and 
appearance into a means of entertainment, providing a parody of the celebrity and no doubt creating 
something new. 
 99. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 808. 
 100. Id. at 807-808. 
 101. Id. at 808;  see also 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2003) (federal fair use statute). 
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task of reconciling the rights of free expression and publicity.”102 
The California court recognized the difficulty that courts face in 
deciding whether the First Amendment is a proper defense to the use of 
a celebrity’s image in those cases where “art” is at issue.103  However, 
the test it articulates provides plaintiffs and defendants some ability to 
assess whether their case contains a transformative element.104  If it does, 
a First Amendment defense should prevail.  If it does not, the 
infringement of the publicity right should exist.  Some certainty to the 
decision-making process and the likely outcome has been added, though 
it is not a bright-line test by any means.105 
Returning to the ETW case, we are told that the plaintiff did not 
directly address the First Amendment privilege claim in the Right of 
Publicity context.106  We have the court’s opinion that the defendant’s 
painting and prints were different in kind from the Elvis posters in the 
Factors case in which the posters were held not to be protected.107  The 
ETW court said that the “defendant’s artistic prints seeking to convey a 
message may be distinguished from posters which merely reproduce an 
existing photograph.”108  Unfortunately, the only message that we are 
made aware of as being conveyed by the paintings of Tiger Woods is 
what the artist claims in its promotional literature and, apparently, 
applies to all of his “sports figure” works.109  Perhaps the work is 
transformative or perhaps it is merely slick merchandising.  A more 
thorough review of the work itself and an effort to distinguish the other 
First Amendment defense cases would have been more useful.  The 
conclusion may well be correct, but the decision is not very helpful as 
guidance in future cases.  Perhaps the Sixth Circuit will be more 
 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. The Supreme Court of California had a recent opportunity to apply the Comedy III test.  In 
Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003), the court found that a portrayal of the well-known 
performing and recording musicians Johnny and Edgar Winters in a comic book did not infringe the 
Winters’ Rights of Publicity.  Id. at 476.  There, the comic book characters were “not just 
conventional depictions of [the] plaintiffs but contain[ed] significant expressive content other than 
plaintiffs’ mere likelinesses.”  Id. at 479.  The drawings were “distorted for purposes of lampoon, 
parody, or caricature.”  Id.  In short, the fact that the comic book parodied the brothers and that 
“[p]laintiffs’ fans who want[ed] to purchase pictures of [the Winter brothers] would find the 
drawings . . .  unsatisfactory as a substitute for conventional depictions,” resulted in a ruling in favor 
of the defendants.  Id.  The First Amendment trumped the Right of Publicity. 
 106. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 834. 
 107. See Factors I, 579 F.2d at 222. 
 108. ETW Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d at  835. 
 109. Id.  Rick Rush’s works have featured Michael Jordan, Mark McGwire, Coach Paul “Bear” 
Bryant, the Pebble Beach Golf Tournament, and the America’s Cup Yacht Race. 
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elucidating in its opinion. 
The two cases, ETW and Comedy III, provide a clear look at the 
friction between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment in those 
cases where the celebrity’s image is used for the sale of a product 
consisting of the celebrity’s image. 
2. The Right of Publicity and Newspapers/Magazines 
The next set of cases that cause a rub between the First Amendment 
and the Right of Publicity deal with the unauthorized use of celebrity 
personas by media, primarily newspapers and magazines. 
It is well settled that the press can use the name, likeness and image 
of a celebrity in a newsworthy context without fear of reprisal, including 
freedom from fear of suit for infringement of the Right of Publicity.110  
Few will quarrel with the need to maintain that freedom of the press.  
The press, however, should not, and need not, be exempt from paying 
for the use of the persona of a celebrity when the use is for purely 
commercial purposes.  However, perhaps due to the success of the 
consistent plaint that any restriction on the activities of the press has a 
“chilling” effect, newspapers and magazines are sometimes given a pass 
on the unauthorized use of personas in the promotion of their 
newspapers and magazines.111  The bookend cases, that seem 
particularly egregious in terms of time and geography, are state court 
cases from New York and California involving the famous professional 
quarterbacks Joe Namath and Joe Montana. 
In 1969, Joe Namath led the New York Jets to the Super Bowl 
championship over the then Baltimore Colts, beating all the odds.  Prior 
to the game, Namath asserted that his team would win, and because of 
his lifestyle and personality, he became a favorite of the sports press and 
a well-known sports personality.  As with most sports figures, Namath 
sold his publicity rights to advertisers who asked him to endorse their 
products.  He alleged that in 1972 he earned “in excess of several 
 
 110. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (discussing New York Times, Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which requires public figures demonstrate “actual malice” in libel 
suits against news sources). 
 111. See Booth v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 223 N.Y.S. 737, 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962); Namath v. 
Sports Illustrated, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Ali,  447 F. Supp. 723; Lerman v. 
Chuckleberry Publ’g, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 966, 970-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, Lerman v. Flynt 
Distributing Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984); Cher v. Forum Int’l, Ltd., 692 F.2d 634, 639 
(9th Cir. 1982); Stephano, 64 N.Y.2d 174, 184; Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc.¸894 F.2d 579, 585 (2d 
Cir. 1990); Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 642 (Cal. Dist Ct. App. 
1995). 
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hundred thousand dollars” through such endorsements.112 
Sports Illustrated, of course, gave extensive coverage to the 1969 
Super Bowl and, thereafter, from time-to-time, ran other articles and 
photographs of Namath reporting on his activities both as a player on the 
field and in his personal life.113  In 1972, Sports Illustrated ran 
advertisements for subscriptions to its magazine in other magazines.114  
The ads featured Namath and included the statement “How to get Close 
to Joe Namath,” in the magazines oriented to the male reader; and the 
statement “The man you love loves Joe Namath,” in the magazines 
oriented to female readers.115  The district court concluded that, 
“[a]dmittedly, [the ad] was used to stimulate subscriptions but this is 
permissible.”116  The appellate court affirmed.117 
Fast forward twenty years.  Joe Montana, the heralded quarterback 
for the San Francisco Forty-Niners and Super Bowl champion in 1989 
and 1990, found himself in a similar situation to that of Joe Namath.118  
The San Jose Mercury News featured stories of the 1989 and 1990 
victories on its front page.119  To celebrate the victories, the newspaper 
issued a special souvenir section devoted to the football team, and on the 
front page of the section, was an artist’s drawing of Montana.120  Each of 
the souvenir pages was then reproduced in poster form, and the posters 
sold to the general public for five dollars each.121  Montana sued for 
infringement of his publicity right, and the newspaper asserted a First 
Amendment defense and filed a summary judgment motion.122  The trial 
court granted the newspaper’s motion and the appellate court 
affirmed.123 
The court relied on cases confirming that no cause of action lies 
against reporting on matters in the public interest and that such reporting 
need not be current events but can be from a historical perspective.124  
The court concluded that, because the actual newspaper accounts of the 
 
 112. Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 80 Misc. 2d 531, 532 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1975), aff’d, 
371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1975). 
 113. Id. at 533. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 533-34. 
 116. Id. (citations omitted). 
 117. Namath, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 11. 
 118. Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639-40. 
 119. Id. at 640. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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victories were protected by the First Amendment, so too were the 
posters.125  The appearance of Montana’s picture on the posters was for 
the same reason it appeared in the newspaper, “because Montana was a 
major player in contemporaneous newsworthy sports events.”126 
The court said it was unable to find any cases on point (though it 
later cites to Namath), but cited a few cases that relate to political 
speech, and stated that “[a] [n]ewspaper [h]as a [c]onstitutional [r]ight to 
[p]romote [i]tself by [r]eproducing [i]ts [n]ews [s]tories.”127  The court 
concluded: “[i]n summary, the First Amendment protects the posters 
complained about here for two distinct reasons: first, because the posters 
themselves report newsworthy items of public interest, and second, 
because a newspaper has a constitutional right to promote itself by 
reproducing its originally protected articles or photographs.”128 
Namath and Montana stretch the envelope.  Clearly, if correct, 
under the guise of self-promotion, newspapers and magazines have an 
unbridled right to enter the merchandise arena with photographs, names 
and likenesses of celebrities whose names, pictures and images appeared 
in their earlier issues.  The Montana court said: “Where, as here, a 
newspaper page covering newsworthy events is reproduced for the 
purpose of showing the quality and content of the newspaper, the 
subsequent reproduction is exempt from the statutory and common law 
prohibitions.”129 
While it seems far-fetched to suggest that a free license to use 
celebrity personas is what these cases provide, one must concede that 
reprinting and selling posters is a far cry from a newspaper using news 
stories to promote itself.  It is one thing to say “look at our coverage of 
the Super Bowl and our excellent photographic coverage of the action 
and compare it to our competitors,” and an entirely different thing to 
have an artist create a picture of a celebrity, run the picture in the paper 
and then make posters of the picture that are sold to the public.  Such an 
undertaking by anyone else would be a clear infringement of Montana’s 
Right of Publicity and, to make an exception for news media, mocks the 
publicity right. 
In between the “bookend” cases of Namath and Montana is another 
New York case in which a model—a person who earns his living by 
posing for photographs for a fee—was denied recovery based on the 
 
 125. Id. at 640-41. 
 126. Id. at 641. 
 127. Id. at 642. 
 128. Id. at 643. 
 129. Id. 
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newsworthiness exception.130  In that case, the model agreed to pose for 
and was paid for modeling for a particular issue of a magazine.131  The 
publisher took one of the pictures of the model wearing a bomber jacket 
and used it in a column entitled “Best Bets” in a different issue of the 
magazine.132  Along with the picture was a legend identifying the 
designer, the price and where the jacket might be purchased.133 
The Court of Appeals for New York (that state’s highest court) held 
that, because regularly appearing column in which the photograph 
appeared was one in which the editors provide information to readers 
including, from time-to-time, prices and other information about 
products of interest to its readers, it was a newsworthy event.134  “It is 
the content of the article and not the defendant’s motive or primary 
motive to increase circulation which determines whether it is a 
newsworthy item, as opposed to a trade usage . . . .”135  The problem 
with this thinking is that an advertisement imparts information and is 
contained in a publication for the same purpose as was the use of the 
photo in the “Best Bets” column.  It must take more than “content” to 
determine whether a use is a “newsworthy use” or an “advertising use” 
or a “trade use.” 
In yet another setting, two newspapers conducted separate polls of 
their readers to decide who was the most popular member of the singing 
group New Kids on the Block.136  The newspapers ran pictures of the 
group and then asked a form of the question “who is your favorite New 
Kid?”137  The “voting” occurred by placing a 900-number call.  The call 
to one paper cost the caller 50 cents and to the other 95 cents.138  One 
paper alleged it was donating the money it received and neither collected 
much money.139  It is clear that the poll was not a standard “man on the 
street” survey that many newspapers run to determine public opinion. 
The New Kids were not pleased that their names and images were 
being used for such purpose and alleged, inter alia, trademark 
infringement and misappropriation.140  Defendants asserted a First 
 
 130. Stephano v. New Group Publ’ns, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 174 (N.Y. 1984). 
 131. Id. at 179. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 184. 
 135. Id. at 185 (citations omitted). 
 136. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 137. Id. at 304. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 304-05. 
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Amendment defense and the trial court granted summary judgment.141  
The Ninth Circuit, Judge Kozinski writing for the court, declined to 
decide the issues on constitutional grounds and held that the use of the 
names and pictures was “nominative use.”142  The court reasoned that 
nominative use is one that arises 
. . . where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on 
consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a 
different one.  Such nominative use of a mark - where the only word 
reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into 
service - lies outside the strictures of trademark law: Because it does 
not implicate the source-identification function that is the purpose of 
trademark, it does not constitute unfair competition; such use is fair 
because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the 
trademark holder.143 
The court decided that the “usual fair” use defense applied when 
the defendant used the plaintiff’s trademark to identify defendant’s 
product and the “nominative use” defense applies when the defendant 
uses the plaintiff’s mark to identify the plaintiff’s product.144 
The use of their names and likenesses without permission in a 
manner that would be misappropriation but for the unauthorized user’s 
status as newspapers, was not actionable because, the court said, “the 
papers have a complete defense to both claims [common law 
misappropriation and commercial misappropriation] if they used the 
New Kids name ‘in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports 
broadcast or account’ which was true in all material respects.”145  In 
 
 141. Id. at 308. 
 142. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id.  It seems that use of the plaintiff’s mark to identify the plaintiff’s goods where there is 
no false advertising should be without any recourse.  The Ninth Circuit, however, has now created a 
test with defined requirements to determine if the use of the plaintiff’s mark by the defendant to 
identify the plaintiff’s goods is actionable.  Id.  First, the product or service “must not be readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark;” second, only so much of the mark “may be used as is 
reasonably necessary to identify the product or service;” and, third, the defendant “must do nothing 
that would . . . suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner.”  Id. at 308.  This 
accretion of tests may have merit, though it is hard to discern the need for a new set of factors when 
the issue is the use of a trademark to identify the actual trademarked product or service.  The current 
factors used to determine unfair competition seem satisfactory.  The use of the trademark of another 
should be permissible except where it is used to deceive or mislead in a manner prohibited under 
unfair competition theories and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.  
Nonetheless, now there is such a new test and new defense, at least in the Ninth Circuit.  See New 
Kids, 971 F.2d at 308.  This new nominative use defense thwarted the recovery by the New Kids 
under their trademark and unfair competition claims.  Id. at 309. 
 145. Id. at 309. 
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other words, the operation of a poll on a topic that seems designed 
purely for the purpose of selling papers and not, as the rather paltry 
participation indicates, for determining an answer to a current topic of 
particular interest, is sufficiently newsworthy to be entitled to the 
exception to liability found in the California publicity statute.  The First 
Amendment need not be discussed because the issue can be resolved 
without considering constitutional questions. 
The difficulty with the various cases and the problem that 
practitioners and owners of publicity rights have is supposing what the 
court will deem newsworthy.  These cases suggest that, if the press in 
any form is the unauthorized user of a publicity right, the owner of the 
right will have a difficult time successfully prosecuting an infringement 
of his/her right.  Newsworthiness is interpreted sufficiently loosely and 
broadly so that almost any activity associated with a press activity will 
be held to be under that umbrella. 
Before closing, it is necessary to consider the one arena where the 
courts sometimes work very hard to find that a publicity right or a 
trademark right will prevail over an unauthorized use in a setting usually 
deemed to be First Amendment territory.  That is in the area of 
pornography.  The courts will try very hard to stop pornographic use.  
Sometimes, in construing the law so that pornography is stopped, law is 
created that cannot withstand close scrutiny. 
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema,146 the 
Second Circuit found that the Dallas Cowboys football team’s 
cheerleader uniforms were so well-known that the use of similar 
costumes in a pornographic movie indicated an association with or 
approval by the plaintiff.147  On the other hand, the use of the image of 
“Babe” Ruth on a calendar would not lead the public to believe that 
Ruth’s heirs have approved of the calendar or are sponsors of it.148  The 
holdings in these two cases seem to say that cheerleaders’ outfits are 
more readily protected than is the persona of a celebrity. 
In Muhammad Ali v. Playgirl,149 the court enjoined Playgirl 
magazine from selling its issue depicting a nude black man in a boxing 
ring that was “unmistakably recognizable” as Ali.150  The court held that 
the use of the likeness was for the purpose of trade and not informational 
 
 146. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 604 F.2d at 200. 
 147. Id. at 205. 
 148. Pirone, 894 F.2d at 585. 
 149. Ali v. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
 150. Id. at 725. 
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or newsworthy.151 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Right of Publicity is a valuable property right.  It provides 
recourse to those whose personas would be used, without authorization, 
by others to sell their own products or services.  Whatever the reason, 
the unauthorized user decided that the use of the persona would help sell 
his or her product or service, that reason validates the value of that 
particular persona, be it the likeness or image, voice, or other indicia of 
the particular person.  The value of that persona does not arise from the 
time, money, effort or any other activity of the unauthorized user.  It is 
either inherent in the appearance or voice of the person whose persona is 
being used, much to the person’s good fortune, or it has been acquired, 
built and created by the person.  In the case of celebrities, the value of 
the persona can be attributed to the inherent value of the persona plus 
the added value resulting from something the persona has done to make 
himself or herself a celebrity.  In any case, it is clear that the 
attractiveness of using the persona to sell a particular product or service 
has nothing to do with the unauthorized user’s efforts.  If the persona 
has value, who is more appropriate to capitalize on the use of the 
persona and who is more appropriate to decide what products and 
services the persona will be associated with or that it will not be 
associated with any commercial venture, than the person represented by 
the persona? 
The First Amendment provides freedom of speech and freedom of 
the press.  It does not provide that the press can use the property of 
others for its own commercial gain without compensation to the owner 
of the property.  Newspapers and magazine publications should be 
exempt from compensating those who have spent their time, effort and 
money to build reputations and images that others want to use because of 
the goodwill associated with them.  When they use the images of 
celebrities in advertisements intended to sell their publications, they 
should pay for the use just as car manufacturers and clothing 
manufacturers must. 
 
 151. Id. at 727. 
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ADDENDUM 
Since this paper was presented at the 2002 Sughrue Symposium at 
the University of Akron Law School, the Sixth Circuit has decided two 
Right of Publicity appeals in which the First Amendment was raised as a 
defense; one being the appeal of ETW Corporation.  The two appeals 
were decided within a month of one another and the two panels came to 
completely different decisions.  Admittedly the panels were applying 
different state law - one applied the law of Michigan and the other the 
law of Ohio.  Nevertheless, the application of the First Amendment 
should be consistent, especially by the same circuit court. 
A.. Rosa Parks 
In September 1998, OutKast, LaFace, Arista Records and BMG 
Entertainment released an album entitled Aquemini.152  The first single 
release from the album was a song titled “Rosa Parks.”153  This song was 
highlighted on the album with a sticker labeling “Rosa Parks” a “hit 
single.”154  This sticker also contained a parental warning that the album 
contained “explicit content.”155 
Rosa Parks, the civil rights movement activist, was not affiliated 
with the record or any of the parties involved in its creation or release.  
As a result, Parks brought an action for infringement of her right of 
publicity, defamation, and interference with ongoing business 
relationships in state court.156  The action was later removed to federal 
court and Parks then added claims of false advertising under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act.157 
The district court found in favor of defendants on cross motions for 
summary judgment on all counts of the complaint, including on the 
claims of false advertising and the Right of Publicity.158 
In reviewing the lower court’s decision with respect to the false 
advertising claim under the Lanham Act, the court of appeals found that, 
“Rosa Parks clearly has a property interest in her name akin to that of a 
person holding a trademark.”159  Parks’s prior commercial activities and 
 
 152. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 441. 
 157. Id. at 442. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 447. 
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her international renown as a civil rights activist provided her with “a 
trademark interest in her name the same as if she were a famous actor or 
musician.”160  Thus, Parks has an economic interest in her name, a 
required element for a Right of Publicity case.161 This fact was 
undisputed and, in fact, stipulated to by the parties.162  In addition, the 
parties agreed that Michigan law applied and that Michigan would 
recognize a Right of Publicity claim.163  The parties only disputed, not 
surprisingly, the application of that right.164 
Noting the importance of a First Amendment defense to a claim of 
infringement of one’s Right of Publicity, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged 
that a balancing test must be employed: “Parks’ [sic] property right in 
her own name versus the freedom of artistic expression.”165 
In applying these principles, the court relied on its analysis of the 
false advertising claims under the Lanham Act.  Specifically, the court 
adopted the test the Second Circuit developed in Rogers v. Grimaldi.166  
The Rogers test provides that “a title will be protected unless it has ‘no 
artistic relevance’ to the underlying work or, if there is artistic relevance, 
the title ‘explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the 
work.’”167 
Rogers concerned the potential infringement of the Rights of 
Publicity of Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers by a movie title and the 
Second Circuit found that “movie titles are protected from right of 
publicity actions unless the title is ‘wholly unrelated’ to the content of  
the work or was ‘simply a disguised commercial advertisement for the 
sale of goods or services.’”168  Under these guidelines, the Sixth Circuit 
had to examine the actual nature of the song. 
The song entitled “Rosa Parks” makes no mention of Parks but 
does have a refrain “move to the back of the bus.”169  A translation of the 
lyrics, presented to the court by Parks, identified the chorus as follows: 
“Be quiet and stop the commotion.  OutKast is coming back out [with 
new music] so all other MCs [mic checks, rappers, Master of 
Ceremonies] step aside.  Do you want to ride and hang out with us?  
 
 160. Id. 
 161. See id. at 460. 
 162. Id. at 460. 
 163. Id. at 459. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 461. 
 166. Id. at 451-52. 
 167. Id. at 448 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999). 
 168. Id. at 461 (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004). 
 169. Id. at 452. 
26
Akron Law Review, Vol. 37 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol37/iss2/1
WEBNER2.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
2004] THE BRIGHT LINE 197 
OutKast is the type of group to make the clubs get hyped-up/excited.”170 
The chorus where “move to the back of the bus” was heard clearly had 
nothing to do with Rosa Parks and the court made this finding.171  
Moreover, one of the OutKast members admitted that the song was not 
about Parks but was a message to OutKast’s competitors.172 
Thus, under the Rogers test, the Sixth Circuit noted that the title 
was unrelated to the lyrics and, therefore, the song was a “disguised 
commercial advertisement” or “adopted solely to attract attention.”173  
The First Amendment did not trump Parks’s Right of Publicity and the 
lower court decision as to the Right of Publicity claim was reversed and 
remanded.  
OutKast and the other defendants appealed the Sixth Circuit ruling 
to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The Court denied certiorari.174  The case 
will now proceed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan. 
B. Tiger Woods 
Just one month after the Rosa Parks decision, a different panel of 
the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing.175 
As stated, ETW Corporation is the exclusive licensing agent for the 
professional golfer Tiger Woods and brought a multi-count cause of 
action against Jireh Publishing, the publisher of artwork created by Rick 
Rush.176  ETW’s complaint, filed in the Northern District of Ohio, 
alleged a mixture of federal and common law claims: trademark 
infringement, dilution, unauthorized use of Woods’s likeness, unfair 
competition, false endorsement, and right to privacy.177  The Sixth 
Circuit found in favor of Jireh on all counts.  The only relevant claim 
here is that of the Right of Publicity, although mention of the ruling on 
the trademark claims is required. 
For the trademark infringement claims relating to the use of 
Woods’s likeness in the painting, the Sixth Circuit found that ETW’s 
claimed trademark rights in all Woods’s images/likenesses was 
 
 170. Id. at 452. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 452-453. 
 173. Id.  at 461. 
 174. LaFace Records v. Parks, 124 S. Ct. 925 (2003). 
 175. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 176. Id. at 918. 
 177. Id. at 919. 
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untenable.178  According to the court, “[i]mages and likenesses of Woods 
are not protectable as a trademark because they do not perform the 
trademark function of designation.”179  Moreover, the court found that 
generally, “a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a 
trademark.”180  Thus, the claims for trademark infringement of Woods’s 
image failed.181  This is in direct contrast to the Sixth Circuit finding in 
Parks that Rosa Parks had a protectable right in her name because of her 
commercial activities and fame.  Had the ETW court followed Parks, it 
could easily have found Woods’s commercial exploitation of and his 
fame in his image or likeness provided him with the ability to protect 
both through trademark law. 
With this backdrop, the ETW court went on to consider Woods’s 
Right of Publicity claim.  In reviewing this claim, the court noted that 
the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the Right of Publicity in 1976 in its 
Zacchini decision but found the common law Right of Publicity trumped 
any First Amendment right the defendant may have had.182  Zacchini 
was eventually appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which overturned 
the state court decision and held that the First Amendment did not 
insulate the defendant from liability.183  The Ohio courts, according to 
the Sixth Circuit, have done little since to develop the Right of Publicity 
since Zacchini.184  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit looked back to 
Zacchini to determine how the Ohio Supreme Court defined the right in 
its decision. 
The Sixth Circuit found that the Ohio high court had relied heavily 
on the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition in defining the right in 
Zacchini.185  Moreover, the Zacchini decision indicated that the Ohio 
Supreme Court would “give substantial weight to the public interest in 
freedom of expression when balancing it against the personal and 
proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity.”186  After a 
review of various Right of Publicity decisions, including Memphis 
Development, Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, White v. 
 
 178. Id. at 922. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. The court fails to explain how its holding can be squared with “Colonel Sanders,” 
“Elvis Presley” and the many, many other federal trademark registrations of the images of particular 
people. 
 181. Id. at 923. 
 182. Id. at 929. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 930. 
 186. Id. at 931. 
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Samsung Electronics America, Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association, and Comedy III, among others, the Sixth Circuit 
chose to look to Ohio case law and the Restatement to decide “where the 
line should be drawn between Woods’s intellectual property rights and 
the First Amendment.”187  It further decided to apply the transformative 
elements test the Supreme Court of California adopted in Comedy III.188 
In sitting as an Ohio court, the Sixth Circuit determined that “Ohio 
would construe its Right of Publicity as suggested in the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition . . . which articulates a rule analogous to 
the rule of fair use in copyright law.”189  This ‘rule’ looks to the 
substantiality and market effect of the celebrity image “in light of the 
informational and creative content of the defendant’s use.”190  To 
summarize, the Sixth Circuit balanced the celebrity’s market for its 
image against the informational and creative nature of the use.191  In so 
doing, the court found in favor of Jireh.192 
The court also addressed the application of the First Amendment 
and favorably cited the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Cardtoons.  
According to the Sixth Circuit, Woods generates significant sums of 
money from his job—playing professional golf.193  His primary job is 
completely unrelated to his Right of Publicity.194  Moreover, in addition 
to his income directly generated from his golf game, Woods reaps 
“substantial financial rewards from authorized appearances and 
endorsements” and these rewards are unrelated to his Right of 
Publicity.195 
In considering Rush’s freedom of expression, the court found that 
Rush “added a significant creative component of his own to Woods’s 
identity.”196  Balancing this interest and the societal interest in the First 
Amendment, the Sixth Circuit concluded “that the effect of limiting 
Woods’s right of publicity in this case is negligible and significantly 
outweighed by society’s interest in freedom of artistic expression.”197 
Last, the court finally reached the issue of the transformative nature 
 
 187. Id. at 931-36. 
 188. Id. at 936. 
 189. Id. at 937. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 938 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
29
Webner and Lindquist: The Bright Line
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
WEBNER2.DOC 4/5/2004  11:19 AM 
200 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:171 
of the work.  The work at issue did not “capitalize solely on a literal 
depiction of Woods.  Rather, Rush’s work consists of a collage of 
images in addition to Woods’s image which are combined to describe, in 
artistic form, a historic event in sports history and to convey a message 
about the significance of Woods’s achievement in that event.”198  The 
transformative elements of Rush’s work entitled it to the full protection 
of the First Amendment.199  The curious reasoning of the court seems to 
state that the multiple unauthorized uses of personas (the collage) 
created an artistic element to the depiction and thereby provided a First 
Amendment defense for the infringement of any one of the unauthorized 
uses. 
In a highly critical dissent, Judge Clay stated that he would have 
reversed the lower court’s judgment, and remanded the case for trial on 
the Lanham Act and Ohio common law trademark and unfair 
competition claims.200  With respect to the right of publicity claim, Judge 
Clay would have reversed and remanded with instructions to enter 
summary judgment in favor of ETW.201 
As to Woods’s likeness, Judge Clay notes that ETW was not 
attempting to protect all images of Tiger Woods, only the one depicted 
in the painting at issue.202  Judge Clay stated: “contrary to the majority’s 
contention, the jurisprudence clearly indicates that a person’s image or 
likeness can function as a trademark as long as there is evidence 
demonstrating that the likeness or image was used as a trademark; which 
is to say, the image can function as a trademark as long as there is 
evidence of consumer confusion as to the source of the merchandise 
upon which the image appears.”203  In this particular case, ETW 
submitted such evidence in the form of a survey showing a high 
incidence of confusion.204 
In reviewing the majority’s holding as to the right of publicity 
claim, Judge Clay agreed that the correct test is the transformative test 
set forth in Comedy III but argued the majority’s application of that test 
was incorrect. 205 
Rush’s print, according to the dissent, “gain[s] [its] commercial 
value by exploiting the fame and celebrity status that Woods has worked 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 938. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 939. 
 203. Id. at 941-942 (citations omitted). 
 204. Id. at 942. 
 205. Id. at 959. 
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to achieve.”206  There is nothing transformative about the work, and 
freedom of speech does not trump the right of publicity.207  
These two decisions not only further cloud the field of Right of 
Publicity law in the various circuit courts, but they also present problems 
for plaintiffs and defendants in Right of Publicity cases in the Sixth 
Circuit.  Which test will be applied to balance the First Amendment 
against a celebrity’s Right of Publicity?  Is the Parks decision limited to 
titles?  Is the ETW ruling confined to paintings?  The Sixth Circuit has 
provided practitioners little, if any, guidance on how to protect and 
enforce a celebrity’s Right of Publicity or on how to defend such an 
action on First Amendment grounds. 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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